Discussion of politico-administrative relations as well as the research on agencies generally treats the "politicisation" of agency management as a single, "black-box" concept, according to which agency managements (and other senior civil servants) are either political or not. Our paper shows that, using a strict, but widely applied defi nition of what constitutes a political appointment, agency heads in Slovakia are overwhelmingly "political", but that the implications of politicisation vary, depending on the type of politicisation. In particular, we distinguish personal nominations of the responsible minister and contrast them with party nominations based on coalition agreements. Based on a series of interviews with senior policy-makers on both sides of the politico-administrative divide, we show that the selection mechanism, incentive structure and robustness of actual accountability mechanisms differs more between these two types of politicisations than between the ministerial and formally "non-political" appointment.
Introduction
Slovakia, similarly to other states in Central and Eastern Europe, has passed through a signifi cant transformation of its public sector in the past two decades. Currently the Slovak public sector consists of several layers including the core state administration and the state agencies. Although the civil-service reform has been conducted in Slovakia (with some backsliding -see e.g. Randma-Liiv and Järvalt 2011; Beblavý 2009; Malíková 2006) , the recruitment processes in the state agencies are only partially touched by the Civil Service Act and usually are covered by distictive rules.
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Th e politicians have several tools to control the state agencies, and one of them is through personnel policy and recruitment systems of the senior management. Th erefore it is not surprising that the politico-administrative relations are studied not only within the core state administration -civil service -but also in the state agencies.
Th e usual approach in studying politico-administrative relations in public institution is to distinguish between applying administrative doctrine (formally "nonpolitical" appointment) vs. political doctrine in recruitment policy, and for personnel decisions made by politicians the general term politicisation is used. However, this approach does not show who the concrete political decision-maker is and what related incentives as well as implications of the given decisions are.
In this paper we therefore look at the particular types of politicisation in the recruitment system of the senior management in the Slovak state agencies and distinguish personal nominations of the responsible minister from party nominations based on coalition agreements. We contrast the legal state of politicisation (how many appointments can de iure be made by politicians in Slovak state agencies) and the real state (what is the infl uence of politicians in recruiting senior management in the agencies, and does it diff er according to an individual or a collective decisionmaker (see below)).
Th e paper consists of 4 parts. It starts with an overview of literature on the politicisation of public administration and its forms. Here we will present three classifi cations of politicisation, focusing on the legality of the appointment, selection criteria for an appointment, and the type of decision-maker. In the second part, the methodology is provided. Our research was conducted in two stages. Th e fi rst one was based on the analysis of legal acts and related to the legal state of politicisation. Th e second one consisted of a series of interviews and was related to the actual state of politicisation. Th e paper continues with presenting the main fi ndings; among others the paper shows that instead of a dichotomy -distinguishing only between ministers or the government as political bodies that nominate the senior management level at the agencies -, the real Slovak political world works with a trichotomy also including the coalition council. Finally, in the last part, the main conclusions are drawn.
Typology of politicisation
On the following pages we focus on the defi nition of basic theoretical concepts associated with the issue of politico-administrative relations and in particular the process of recruitment into the public sector as discussed by the researchers.
In the aft ermath of every election the politicians start to exercise the powers vested to them, generally having the ambition to fulfi l the promises made to voters in the campaign. To achieve this goal they can turn to the state administration in-cluding the public agencies. Naturally, there are many defi nitions of agencies. Here, we refer to agencies as legally distinct state-budgetary organisations which are autonomous from ministries (although sometimes formally subordinated to them) and implement core state functions (regulation, collection of taxes and other state revenue, enforcement of laws) rather than deliver services.
1 In other words, our focus is on institutions delivering core state functions, but usually not performing a policy-making functions, which is the province of ministries.
Th e personnel make-up of these institutions is not always in accordance with the expectations of either of the actors with respect to which people to include in the team managing the individual departments. Th us, Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman defi ned the relations between politicians and the civil service as an uneasy partnership in charge of the modern state (Aberbach et al. 1981) . Th e uneasy partnership between the given actors is driven by diff erent expectations with regard to the types of activities performed by actors, as well as their quality, by which we mean their knowledge capacity, willingness to take action, enthusiasm for change or innovations, including the expectations of loyalty of diff erent sorts. In this paper we focus only on one specifi c aspect of these relations, namely the relation of political elites towards the civil servants. More specifi cally, we focus on the application of the so-called doctrine of political rationality in recruiting agency top representatives as described above. Th is approach is called politicisation in the broader sense of the word, since politicisation is a term that is used to describe diff erent processes in a society. It is associated with a (change in the) number of (party) political nominations, (party) political loyalty of the civil servants, as well as the political sensitivity of the bureaucracy ( Van der Meer et al 2007) .
Similarly Peters defi nes politicisation as the substitution of the merit principle in the recruitment process by the system of promotion, reward and obedience of the civil servants according to the political criteria (Peters 2010) . As already stated, this is quite a broad defi nition and in this paper, we only use the term as defi ned by Gregory (2004) , who sees politicisation as "the capacity for the political executive to exercise authority directly in the appointment of top governmental offi cials. "
Th ere are a number of mechanisms with the goal of ensuring top-down politicisation (see for example Van den Meer (2009) ), and we more specifi cally defi ne the individual forms of top-down politicisation in the following text.
Th e fi rst classifi cation results from the legal perspective. Here we can diff erentiate between political nominations de iure and de facto (see also Ondrušová and Beblavý 2012) . Th e former is the situation in which a politician has a formalised authority to choose and appoint the members of his / her cabinet, directors of a state agency or advisors. In the latter case there is no legal authorisation for this method of recruitment, but it happens in practice. An example of this is a manipulation, an informal political nomination to permanent position in the state sector.
Within the de iure framework of legal politicisation we can speak of the socalled structural politicisation. It is a creation of formal legal structures, positions within the organisation that are fi lled according to the decisions of the political authority, and the appointment of these positions through political nomination of this kind is legal (Rouban 2004 ). In the case of structural politicisation it is possible to further distinguish which levels of the department are subjected to the structural politicisation. An example can be taken from the appointment of people to the departmental offi ces, the appointment to the senior positions in the state administration or the managerial posts in the departmental agencies. Another example of structural politicisation is the deconstruction of the lineal bureaucratic hierarchy and the creation of a new institution -QUANGO, which is more likely to be responsive to the orders of the political leadership. A change occurs in terms of the environment within which the decisions are made, and a greater control of the decisions adopted is ensured by the political nomination of the decision-makers. From a principal-agent perspective, elected party politicians (principals) use the power to appoint to ensure that the policies they decide will be implemented without distortions by appointees (agents) which need not be the case of civil servants (Kopecky et al. 2011; Huber and Shipan 2002) .
At the same time, due to less media publicity and public pressure, political appointees as key representatives of QUANGOs can also be used as tools of the strengthened political or personal infl uence of the decision-maker, the personal or party patronage, especially in cases where the core civil service is governed by stricter rules and professional performance is expected (Beblavy 2002) . On the one hand, this might seem contrary to the ambition to delegate autonomy, particularly in personnel and fi nancial issues, to independent expert-based agencies. In fact, such autonomy is considered a key feature of the agencies (see e.g. Beblavy 2009; Gill 2002) . However, it is still elected politicians who, in the end, are accountable to citizens for governing the public sector, with QUANGOs not taking a part. Th erefore, political appointments to these positions instead of complete delegation of power to civil servants need not be surprising. Th us one of the core factors strengthening the existence of the structural politicisation cited in the literature are the legal and / or political diffi culties in changing the civil servants who are ignoring the needs of the current political leadership, which is dissatisfi ed with their performance (Peters and Pierre 2004; Meyer-Sahling 2004, Page and Wright 1999) . Th is can lead to the duplicity of employees, when the cadres chosen by the politicians are complementing the career civil servants.
When talking about top-down politicisation, a second typology can also be used, dividing politicisation into patronage, functional politicisation and formal politicisation. In this typology the criterion is the incentive of the decision-maker related to the responsiveness and competence of an appointee. Kaufman (1956) describes bureaucrats as professionals who can ensure stability and continuity in policy-making by means of a merit system and without interference of politicians in the recruitment process. Th ese bureaucrats are competent and neutral in providing their expertise to any political leadership. Th is approach is known as neutral competence (Kaufman 1956 ). However, politicians oft en see bureaucrats as loyal adherents to the previous government (Meyer-Sahling 2004) , who are too rigid to adapt to current political and policy ambitions. Th is is especially obvious in cases when public administration as such is subject to reforms. In that case, bureaucrats can even become an interest group protecting current organisational settings. Due to information asymmetry, they are in a better position compared to the politicians and can easily defend the status quo in organisational terms rather than public interest (Peters 2010) . As a result, politicians prefer to appoint new recruits rather than senior offi cials for some positions. Th ese appointees are experts who share the politicians's views regarding the given agenda. In this context, Svara (2001) uses the term responsive competence. Th e appointees are experts supporting politicians who usually act as managers seeking to pursue their agenda. In other words, politicians use their right to appoint the nominees to some positions in order to ensure a good implementation of the decisions made by politicians. Finally, pure responsiveness refers to the situation of a politician appointing a person who is not an expert in a given fi eld, but is committed to the politician's preferences. In practice, this can be a situation where an appointee acts as a kind of controller and mediator to the politician rather than the real manager or director of that institution.
Th us, in sum, the process of recruitment by the political leaders to the top management-level positions does not have to involve party patronage or party appointees with no professional qualifi cation. Politicisation, as has been noted above, can also occur with the goal of improving the political compatibility of bureaucrats and politicians in their view of individual policies. Value-sharing does not necessarily mean party affi liation, and its societal legitimacy is higher than in cases of using pure responsiveness, even though this changes with time as suggested by Peters (2004) . Th erefore, returning to the second typology, the politicisation can have a form of patronage, functional politicisation or formal politicisation.
In the case of personal and party patronage / clientelism, the key factor in the appointment is personal or party loyalty (Bearfi eld 2009), and the decision-maker chooses it for a number of reasons. An example is the formation and strengthening of party structures, as well as the personal positions of power in the party and the surrounding environment. Th is system of recruitment by political appointment is typical of developing countries, less so in the older democracies, even though in some of these countries we can observe cases of patronage. Greece would serve as an example in this respect (Van der Meer et al 2007) .
With respect to the functional politicisation, numerous authors cite the political responsibility of politicians who need tools to ensure the fulfi lment of duties and want to have greater control over policies as well as the performance outcomes of organisations over which they hold political responsibility. Th e public tends to view politicians as responsible for the actions taken within their department. Functional politicisation thus comes into existence as a reaction to the problem of control (Peters and Pierre 2004) and as a coordination mechanism. Th is is why numerous authors (for example Mulgan 1999) divide this type of politicisation into two subtypes, which in practice are oft en hard to diff erentiate, namely the policy-oriented politicisation and managerial politicisation. Th is shows that the recruitment by political leaders to the senior public positions does not have to involve party patronage or party appointees with no professional qualifi cation. Politicisation, as has been noted above, can also occur with the goal of improving the political compatibility of bureaucrats and politicians in their views of individual policies. Value-sharing does not necessarily mean party affi liation.
Formal politicisation is a situation where the appointment is directed by the political decision-maker, but the criteria of the selection are based exclusively on the expertise. Th e reason for this situation can be the tradition of appointment by the political decision-maker to the particular position and broad societal consensus for a required professionalism in the given senior position.
Finally, although not previously addressed in the literature, we also fi nd it important to classify politicisation according to the type of political decision-maker. Based on this criterion, political decision-makers can be individuals as well as collective organs. Individuals are ministers who are directly responsible for controlling their appointees and at risk of dismissal in case of these appointees's failure. At the same time, and perhaps therefore, it is more likely that they need not consult their choice of appointee with some other subject such as partner coalition parties (which is the case for the government). On the other hand, collective decision-makers are those who appoint a candidate as a result of negotiations between all relevant partners. Namely they are mainly governments. In coalition governments this picture gets much more complicated, and it can be in fact political parties who reserve the right to appoint to top positions. We will deal with this issue in more detail in the methodology part.
Th e following table provides a summery of the types of politicisation. • To what extent is there a structural / de-iure politicisation in the Slovak public agencies ?
• What type of politicisation is it -individual or collective politicisation ?
• What is the real / de-facto politicisation of the selection of the senior management level in the Slovak state agencies ?
• What is the relation between de-iure and de-facto politicisation in the Slovak state agencies ?
To answer the fi rst two questions we look at the way the senior management level at agencies has to be selected and who makes that decision as defi ned by the law. Here the fi rst criterion for determining the type of political function according to the decision-maker is individual and collective decisions.
Th e Slovak government is an example of a collective body. However, the government is not the only collective body, which has the power to conduct political nominations, and in this group we can also include the parliament. Th e power to appoint certain positions is also in the hands of the president of the republic. Th e president seemingly operates as an individual body by himself. However, his nominations cannot be fully compared with the nominations of the minister, especially if the president is elected directly by the people. Th e diff erence is that while the minister has a political responsibility for his nominee, and in case of the latter's failure there will be pressure on the minister to resign, there is no such direct responsibility for the president. Furthermore, the nominee of the president has no accountability towards the latter as the nominee is not his subordinate.
Th erefore the second criterion for determining the type of political function according to the decision-maker is the political responsibility, where the direct political responsibility is in the hands of ministers and the indirect political responsibility in the hands of collective bodies and the president. An overview of the combination of both criteria is off ered in the following table. Based on this typology of decision-makers two types of political positions were identifi ed for the purpose of research:
• collective political positions (CPP), which are fi lled through appointment by the government or parliament;
• ministerial political positions (MPP), which are fi lled through ministerial appointment by the minister or another individual body which holds direct political as well as substantive responsibility.
We included presidential appointments, somewhat counterintuitively, under collective decision-making. Th e reasons were twofold. First of all, in practice the presidential appointment in Slovakia is generally a fi nalisation of a nomination process where the nomination is made by the government or the parlimant. Secondly, even in the very limited number of cases where the president is the sole appointment authority, his indirect political responsibility and lack of accountability for the performance of agencies makes him more akin to collective rather than ministerial nominations in our conceptualisation.
As for the research sample, we looked at the politico-administrative relations in 44 agencies that were established and are regulated by individual law. In other words, they were not set up under a general regulation, but have one of their own. Th is criterion was applied for two reasons:
• it is a good proxy for the political importance of the agency and its position as a body;
• it means that the procedures for the appointment and dismissal of senior personnel tend to be individually regulated by the law so that the sample is diverse and refl ects a variety of sectoral or even individual factors.
Th ese 44 agencies can be further divided into two groups:
• 17 autonomous regulatory organisations at the central level 2 , and
• 27 organisations subordinated to various Slovak ministries.
3 Th e data were collected based on a review of an annual set of laws and their amendments from 1993 to 2011.
To answer the third question we conducted more than 20 interviews with senior policy-makers on both sides of the politico-administrative divide. Th e sample of interviewees included individuals that were appointed to one or more of the following positions:
• minister, • state secretary of the ministry, • advisor to the minister, • director general of a section (highest level of ministerial administration), • director of a division (the second highest level of ministerial administration) • chief executive of a budgetary or contributory organisation. Th e optimal interviewee was an individual who held the same or diff erent positions during the numerous governments and for the longest period of time to increase the information yield of the interview and allowed a direct comparison of personal experience. Th e sample included some prominent and politically active individuals as well as some non-prominent individuals with long-term connections to a particular political party but also some individuals who are neither members of nor associated with any political party. With regards to the nature of the interviewees and the questions they were asked, they were informed that even though the analysis of the fi ndings will include the information and the citations they off ered, these will not be associated with the names nor be presented in a way that could allow any identifi cation.
Th e sample of ministries covered in the research includes the key departments from the point of view of political, fi scal and security weight and at the same time respects their diversity, so that it allows it to uncover the diff erences between diff erent types of departments. Th e ministries are: Th e interviews were conducted in the months of May-August 2011 and covered the governance of four executives: Dzurinda I, Dzurinda II, Fico, Radičová. All together it covered 13 and a half years. Th e period of these four governments was chosen because it covers a suffi cient diversity of governments and the ruling parties to allow us to make generalised observations.
Main fi ndings
Th e research came with 3 main fi ndings. Th e fi rst fi nding is related to the way the senior management is selected in the Slovak state agencies. Th e methods of political vs. formalised selection of the senior staff members in listed institutions as defi ned in the methodology are shown in Table 3 . Th e data in the table show that the amount of institutions have nearly doubled since the creation of the Slovak Republic (increase from 26 to 44) and the amount of the positions in the senior management have nearly tripled (from 60 to 163), which is also related with the act of creating branches of these institutions. As for the way the senior management level is selected, the data clearly show that the vast majority of senior management personnel at the selected sample of public agencies (budgetary and contributory organisations) are fi lled through political processes that imply de-iure structural politicisation of these types of state agencies.
However, as we have showed in the methodology, decision-makers within the political processes may diff er, and we distinguished between individual (for example ministerial) politicisation with clear accountability for the nominee and collective (for example governmental) politicisation with less clear political accountability for the nominee. Table 4 provides an overview of the types of politicisation in the given set of public agencies. Th e data in table 4 show that the de-iure politicisation of these public agencies is mainly given to the hands of ministries that would imply clear political accountability to political nominees.
Th e senior management at the organisations subordinated to ministries is mostly selected by ministers, whereas in the case of autonomous regulatory organisations (such as the Statistical Offi ce) it is mostly a collective decision. It implies that the legal form of selection is related to the type of the state agency.
As for agencies subordinated to ministries, it is also to be noted that the minister is in some cases directly limited by the law when selecting the candidate. Th ere are two types of limitations, sometimes they are combined. Either they revolve around the matter of his current term and previous experiences, or they are based upon the responsibility of the minister to consult in the selection of the candidate. Source: authors Th e second fi nding is related to de-facto politicisation -how the decisions concerning the recruitment of the senior management level are done in reality. From the interviews we can conclude that the personal decision-making about senior management-level positions at the central government level, including state agencies, is divided among three actors:
• minister or state secretary (including possible infl uences of his party or other in-groups on his decision-making);
• coalitional decision-making, where the positions are allocated to individual parties that are able to make the decision partially or absolutely independently from the minister;
• long-term stability and mostly technocratic personnel decision-making, where the particular position is not fi lled only de iure, but also de facto on the basis of an apolitical approach, in which neither the minister and nor the political parties interfere.
Personal decisions of the minister and the state secretary of the ministry mainly concern the head of the ministerial administration and the minister's advisors, and to a certain degree also the directors general of the sections and the CEOs of subordinated organisations (mostly budgetary organisations). Personal decisions are fragmented on the basis of the power structure in the government department. In some places they are concentrated only in the hands of the minister, in other places, this power is dispersed to the state secretary of the ministry and other key personnel (selected advisors, selected directors general …). An example comes from the Ministry of Education, where the long-time senior executive said that during the Radičová government the following situation occurred: "Today, the Minister is involved only to a small degree in personnel recruitment, and this concerns only the people that are closest to him. From the section below they delegate the authority downwards -delegation of authority in practice. " According to a clerk serving under the Dzurinda government operating in the Ministry of Justice this had been the way of doing things: "Th e Minister had brought his own key people, and then they chose the staff that they needed. Meaning that there had been no single authority that would pick people. "
Coalition-based appointments are related mainly to the statutory positions in local state administration and high executive positions in important organisations controlled by the ministry, mainly in the largest companies and key agencies. When speaking of the border between personal and coalition decisions, according to a politician who in the past worked in a leading position of the department: "With respect to the local state administration, national agencies and public companies, we can observe in time a larger, more formal, clearer and rising acceptance of politicisation of the management positions. It does not seem legitimate to parties that the minister should have a veto power in local positions. Th ere is a strong pressure of parties on a particular level and an understanding that local positions are local aff air. " Th e same politician explained: "Th e party has an interest in putting their people in these particular positions for the reasons of patronage, fi nancing of the party, rewards or putting forward their ideology. Costs of this approach for the party are limited, because it receives discontent only partially -also the costs of the incompetence are limited -it hurts the party indirectly, but mainly the minister. Cost-benefi t for the party / party members turns out diff erently from the one for the minister and governmental department. For the minister, the partisan nature of the person is not his main problem, but the incompetence, corruption and the threat that the governmental department will be controlled through partisan nomination by somebody else. " Other politician that had taken part in the management of the department agreed: "Th e party is spread out territorially, and there are many people that are trying to get work in this way. Local overlords are much more aggressive when placing their people into these positions, and this is how it works in each party. You can fi ght against it only by the power of the minister. When I was in power, people could not get to the department and its main structures in this manner, mostly into the regional matters. I saw it as a necessary evil. It was more important to uphold the main structures, to not let anyone in there. "
Long-term stability and the technocratic type of decision-making mainly concerns the directors of the divisions and lower executive positions, as well as less important budgetary organisations of the government ministry. In many cases it also aff ects the general directors of the divisions. Th ese borders are quite fl uid and are changing as an eff ect of the political power of the minister and the type of government department.
One of the possible examples of these diff erences is the Ministry of Finance under the leadership of Ivan Mikloš and Ján Počiatek. At fi rst, Ivan Mikloš largely fi lled the key positions of chief executives of the sections and more technocratically oriented agencies (control of debt and liquidity, state treasury) with technocrats according to his personal decisions. Th is created a space in which Ján Počiatek and, aft er his return, Ivan Mikloš were not able to change these positions anymore. Th us borders of the technocracy were defi ned quite broadly at the Ministry of Finance, both vertically and horizontally. Th e clash of the personal, partisan and coalition principles has been happening and is happening in relation to two key agencies, the tax and the customs directorate. Th e chief executives of these institutions were appointed largely due to personal decisions of the ministers; local chief executives of the tax and customs directorates were much more of a coalition decision, and the ministers were able to control it only in a limited way.
On the other hand, for example in the Ministry of Education such a stabilisation and de-politicisation has never been successful, and so the positions of the chief executives and statutory organisations have remained mainly a personal decision of the minster, but at the same time the local positions are still subordinate to the coalition agreements. Th e Ministry of Education is quite an extreme, as we have been able to see above, for which the ministers from the SNS can be held accountable.
A third example is the Ministry of Justice under the leadership of Daniel Lipšic and Štefan Harabin, where in neither case there was a major interference from the side of the coalition, but there was a very strong imprint of the personal decisions of the minister.
Th ese fi ndings are summarised in Scheme 1, which shows stylised fi ndings about the decision-making regarding personnel questions and their placement amongst the three already mentioned decision-making points.
Scheme 1
Who actually is in charge of the recruitment to the signifi cant positions Source: Authors Due to the lack of relevance of formal institutions none of the actors use the formal legal framework for the diff erentiation and conceptualisation of political and non-political actors. Minister, state secretary and the head of offi ce are clearly understood to be political actors. With respect to other actors, it is diffi cult to apply a generalisation.
From the point of view of factors that are the key for self-identifi cation as well as the identifi cation by others, we pinpointed the three main ones.
Th e fi rst factor is the method of nomination, meaning not the formal recruitment process, but who contacted the individual and with what purpose. A number of interviewees found a more important diff erence between coalition and personal patronage than between the personal patronage and technocratic decision-making. Coalition nominees are seen as more "politicised" since they are not chosen directly by the minister, and the question of responsive competence can quite oft en be completely ignored. For example, with regard to the ambassadors a long-term middle manager said: "When choosing the ambassadors there is no diff erence if the minister comes from within the system or from the outside -because this is done by the government or even coalition, but not the minister. " Th e second factor is socialisation, where even an individual coming from an external environment behaves in a certain manner creating his personal connections and relations. If his personal values and the culture of work is consistent with the culture of the administration of the given department, and if he successfully adapts to this environment, and especially if he displays professional and technical competence in the manner appreciated by the department, the level of his perceived politicisation can be severely weakened. However, the more his role is directly linked with the minister, party and their political activity -for example a spokesperson -the smaller this chance becomes. At the same time there is also an institute of "absorption", where the parties can "absorb" an existing employee in his position, and this employee can still be viewed as apolitical but with an added offi cial political identity.
Th e third factor is sustainability. Th e real test of identity is what happens aft er the change of government. Relatively sharp breaks between Mečiar and Dzurinda, Dzurinda and Fico or Fico and Radičová together with high degree of change in the senior positions lead to the observation that if an individual survives the change of government, his / her political identity withers regardless of how he / she was originally appointed to the position. Th is was best described by a former advisor to numerous ministers: "A person who experienced numerous ministers in the offi ce in the same position becomes a part of the system. "
Th e third fi nding of our research is related to diff erences between de-iure and de-facto rules on senior management selection in the Slovak state agencies. We have found that there are some discrepancies between a de-iure and a de-facto approach in this area:
• Formal and informal rules are not always the same.
• Although the acts provide a dichotomy and distinguish only between minister and government as decision-makers in appointing the senior management level of the state agencies, the real world works with a trichotomy. It means that many of the senior managers at the state agencies are de facto selected by the coalition council / representatives of political parties rather than the government.
Conclusion
Th e research conducted on politico-administrative relations in the Slovak state agencies enables us to defi ne "the Slovak model" 4 in this area based on the features of the system that persist or do not change on a larger scale with the change of the governments and the formal rules. In other words, both political representatives and legal acts regulating politico-administrative relations have changed several 4 The research did not focus on other V4 countries (the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary) and we did not compare our research fi ndings with the situation in these countries. In fact, in the given three countries, there is a small number of scholars focusing on the politico-administrative relations in the public sector and we did not succeed in fi nding suffi cient amount of the data or conclusions for serious comparison with the Slovak case. Therefore we cannot conclude if Slovakia is an exception in the region (outlier), or, on the contrary, is a typical example in the CEE.
times over the past two decades, but according to our fi ndings the real practice has changed much less.
Our research proved structural / de-iure politicisation in the selection of the senior management level of the state agencies in Slovakia, as most of the positions are being decided by politicians. Specifi cally, in 2011, 146 out of the 163 senior positions we examined were appointed de iure politically. Th e picture has changed only somewhat over the last 20 years though there was a slight increase in the non-political positions in 2000s. However, only 52 out of the 146 positions were appointed by a collective political body whereas 94 were appointed by an individual minister.
Switching to the de-facto manner of appointments, we showed that real decision-makers on concrete position are not necessarily the same as defi ned by law, and the decisions are made not only by ministers or government but also by the coalition council. From the interviews we can conclude that the personal decisionmaking about senior management-level positions at the central government level, including state agencies, is divided into three actors:
• coalitional decision-making, where the positions are allocated to individual parties that are able to make decisions partially or absolutely independently from the minister;
• long-term stability and mostly technocratic personnel decision-making, where the particular position is not fi lled only de iure, but also de facto on a basis of an apolitical approach, in which neither the minister nor the political parties interfere.
Th e personal decision of the minister and the state secretary of the ministry mainly concerns the head of the ministerial administration and the minister's advisors, and to a certain degree also the directors general of the sections and CEOs of subordinated organisations (mostly budgetary and contributory organisations). Coalition-based appointments are related mainly to the statutory positions in local state administration and high executive positions in important organisations controlled by the ministry, mainly in the largest companies and key agencies. Th e rest is what we call "technocratic" appointments.
When we look at diff erences between de-iure and de-facto, there are discrepancies. Not only are the formal and informal rules not always the same, but even though the acts provide a dichotomy and distinguish only between minister or government as decision-makers in appointing the senior management level of the state agencies, the real world works with a trichotomy. It means that many of the senior managers at the state agencies are de facto selected by the coalition council / representatives of political parties rather than government.
We therefore suggest not to treat "politicisation" of agency management as a single, "black-box" concept according to which agency managements (and other senior civil servants) are either political or not as the implications of politicisation vary depending on the type of politicisation. We recommend to work with a trichotomy rather than a dichotomy of political selection processes and distinguish personal nominations of the responsible minister from party nominations based on coalition agreements. Th e selection mechanism, incentive structure and robustness of actual accountability mechanisms diff ers more between these two types of politicisations than between the ministerial and formally "non-political" appointment.
